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TOWARDS THE HEART OF THE SPORT:
A SPORTING PERSPECTIVE ON ABRAHAM & VENEKLASEN
JOINT VENTURE V AMERICAN QUARTER HORSE
ASSOCIATION
Samuel D. Hinkle and Maria Gall
INTRODUCTION
R ules defining the characteristics of horses that may be registeredwith a particular breed organization are essential to defining not
only the breed to which the organization is devoted but also the collateral
activities of the organization necessary to promote the breed, such as show
competitions, jumping, and racing. These rules for registration are simply
"rules of sport"- rules that are most efficiently made by the governing body
of the organization, it having the incentive to maximize value for its
participant members and spectators. Yet, like any rules of sport that by
definition must exclude certain equipment in favor of other equipment-
with the idea of horses being akin to equipment explored later in this
Article-breed registration standards have become the object of serious
antitrust scrutiny. In 2013, the American Quarter Horse Association's rule
prohibiting the registration of Quarter Horses produced by cloning was
found to violate both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The American
Quarter Horse Association did not assert its registration standard as a rule
of sport, which would have entitled it to the analytical deference afforded
such rules in antitrust cases. Nevertheless, rules that regulate the
registration and use of horses in equestrian events are not substantially
different from those rules that regulate the use of equipment in other
activities and sports-standards that have typically been upheld by courts.
* Mr. Hinkle, J.D. 1972, Yale; B.A. 1969, Washington and Lee University; is a partner at Stoll
Keenon Ogden, where he is a member of the firm's board of directors and chairs the firm's litigation
department and business litigation practice. Ms. Gall, J.D. 2006, University of Kentucky; MSc 2013,
London School of Economics & Political Science; B.Mus. 2002, Vanderbilt University, is an associate at
Stoll Keenon Ogden and a member of the firm's business litigation practice. The authors would like to
thank their colleagues, William J. Hunter, Jr., Thomas E. Rutledge, and Brad S. Keeton for their
assistance and comments.
2 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., &NAT. RESOURCES L.
This Article addresses the implications of accepting breed registration
standards as "rules of sport," including how in McHugh v. Australian Jockey
Club the comparison of registration rules to rules of sport influenced the
court's decision to reject the applicant's claims that the Australian Jockey
Club's rules prohibiting the registration of Thoroughbreds bred by artificial
insemination violated Australia's antitrust laws. We begin Part I with an
overview of claims under the Sherman Act and how under its structure
Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. American Quarter Horse Association
was brought and decided. In Part II, we explore why rules on the
registration of horses are rules of sport, including the McHugh court's
analysis on the matter. In Part III, we discuss the implications for the
antitrust analysis when breed registration rules are accepted as rules of sport.
Finally, in Part IV, we look briefly at how antitrust claims concerning rules
of sport can have perverse effects to devalue the sport.
I. CLONING THE AMERICAN QUARTER HORSE
In 2012, Plaintiffs Jason Abraham, Abraham Equine, Inc., and
Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture filed suit against the American
Quarter Horse Association (AQHA), alleging that Rule 227(a) of the
association's Rules and Regulation violated federal antitrust laws by
prohibiting the registration of Quarter Horses produced by cloning.' Jason
Abraham was a rancher from Canadian, Texas who had approximately
2,500 recipient mares available for cloning. Abraham also had a contract
with Viagen, Inc., which held patents for the use of somatic cell nuclear
transfer ("SCNT"), i.e., cloning.' Meanwhile, Dr. Gregg Veneklasen was a
veterinarian from Canyon, Texas, specializing in equine reproduction, and
' Complaint at 13, Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. Am. Quarter Horse Association
(AQHA), No. 12 Civ. 00103 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2012).
2 Sonny Williams, Gregg Veneklasen's Cloning Quest, QUARTER HORSE NEWS (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://www.quarterhorsenews.com/index.php/news/current-issue-of-qhn/features/10200-gregg-
veneklasens-genetic-quest.html.
Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5, Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. Am. Quarter
Horse Association (AQHA), No. 13-11043 (5th Cir. Dec. 26,2013).
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in particular, cloning.' Through their joint venture, Abraham and
Veneklasen owned several Quarter Horses produced by cloning.s
The AQHA is a not-for-profit, breed registry dedicated to the Quarter
Horse. As noted in its Bylaws, its purpose is:
[T]o collect, record and preserve the pedigrees of American
Quarter Horses; to maintain a Stud Book and registry to
record the history, breeding, exhibition, and racing of
American Quarter Horses; and to stimulate the publicity
and improvement of this breed; together with all other
matters necessary or convenient to further the interests of
the breed.'
The science of cloning animals has a relatively short history. It dates
back to 1997, when Scottish scientists from the University of Edinburgh
revealed that they had produced the first clone of an adult mammal-Dolly,
the world's most famous sheep.7 In 2003, six years after Dolly, Italian
scientists created the world's first cloned horse-Promotea, a Haflinger
mare.' Five years later, Promotea became the first clone to reproduce.'
Advances in cloning continued, and in 2006, Viagen succeeded in creating a
clone of Royal Blue Boon, a cutting horse registered with the AQHA.o
The process of cloning is simpler to explain than to successfully
execute. DNA from the cells of a donor horse is transferred into mature
oocytes gathered from the recipient mare. Oocytes are simply eggs from
which the genetic material has been removed. Sperm extract is used to
Id. at 22; Williams, supra note 3.
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 44.
6 American Quarter Horse Association Bylaws, Art. 1, Sec. 2, AQHA,
http://aqha.com/Resources/2014-Handbook/Corporation-Bylaws/Article-.aspx_(last visited Oct.15,
2014).
, Nicolas Wade, The Clone Named Dolly, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/booming/the-clone-named-dolly.html?_r=0.
' John Nielsen, World's First Cloned Horse Born, NPR (Aug. 6, 2003, 12:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1387175; Stacy Pigott, Horse cloning technology
dates to 2003, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS (July 29, 2013, 11:25 PM), http://amarillo.com/news/local-
news/2013-07-29/equine-cloning-technology-dates-2003.
Nielsen, supra note 9; Pigott, supra note 9.i Sherri L. Barclay, Mirror, Mirror:A Look at ViaGen/Encore Cloning Process, HORSE GAZETTE
(June 2006), http://www.horsegazette.com/Monthly-Features/06-June/Miror.htmnl.
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stimulate the oocyte to replicate fertilization and form an embryo. The
embryo is then transferred into the uterus of the recipient mare, and if
everything goes to plan, the embryo will develop into a fetus, which will
eventually be born. n The cloned animals are genetically identical. Success
rates, however, remain fairly low.12 Only 25% of embryos result in a live
birth." Additionally, about half of cloned foals will present with
abnormalities upon birth.14 Nonetheless, cloning-when successful-solves
certain dilemmas faced by breeders. For instance, cloning allows for the
reproduction of horses that are gelded early in life to enable more effective
training and performance."s It also allows owners to "bank" genetic
material, providing the owner the option of later reproducing a horse that
was prematurely lost due to illness or injury before it could be bred. Thus,
it was not surprising that Abraham and Veneklasen invested so heavily in
perfecting this technology, and in turn, challenged registration standards
which they perceived as inhibiting their entry to the breeding and racing
markets.
Most breed registry associations explicitly prohibit the registration of
horses produced by cloning. In addition to the AQHA, registries for the
Appaloosa, Arabian, Freisian, Haflinger, Lippizan, Morgan, Paint Horse,
and Thoroughbred have rules that directly or indirectly exclude cloned
horses from registration.' 6  The AQHA responded to the issue of
registering clones in 2004 when it adopted Rule 227(a), which stipulated:
" Kaye Meynell, Cloning: Reproducing the Original?, PASO FINO HORSE WORLD (Mar./Apr.
2013), http://vpub.boyd-printing.com/display-article.php?id=1326899.
12 id.
13 id.
14 id
15 Id.
16See Appaloosa Horse Club (ApHC) Oficial Handbook, Rule 205H, APPALOOSA HORSE CLUB,
available at http://www.appaloosa.com/pdfs/rulebookl4.pdf ("No horse that is produced from cloning
shall be registered with the ApHC"); World Arabian Horse Organization (WAHO) Conference, Doha,
Qatar, Nov. 1-8, 2011, WORLD ARABIAN HORSE ORGANIZATION, Rule 19, available at
http://www.waho.org/waho-2011-conference.html ("[I]t remains a mandatory WAHO rule that any
Arabian of any age produced by cloning and that the foals of any Arabian which was produced by
cloning must not be registered under any circumstances."); Fresian Horse Society (FHS) Breed Book
Regulations, Rule 2.13, FRESIAN HORSE SOCIETY BREED, available at
http://www.friesianhorsesociety.citymaker.com/f/2012 BBR_7-10-2012.pdf ("Cloning will not be
allowed"); American Haflinger Society Rules, Rule 22, AMERICAN HAFLINGER REGISTRY, available at
http://www.haflingerhorse.com/documents/AHR Rulesregulations.pdf ("No Haflinger born as the
result of cloning will be registered with the American Haflinger Registry"); Registration Guide, Rule 4,
UNITED STATES LIPiZZAN FEDERATION, available at http://www.uslipizzan.org/files/uslf-
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Horses produced by any cloning process are not eligible for
registration. Cloning is defined as any method by which
the genetic material of an unfertilized egg or an embryo is
removed and replaced by genetic material taken from
another organism, added to/with genetic material from
another organism or otherwise modified by any means in
order to produce a live foal."
The issue was raised again at the 2008 AQHA Convention when the
Stud Book and Registration Committee (SBRC) considered a proposed
change to Rule 227(a) that would allow a live foal produced through SCNT
to be registered if its DNA matched that of a registered American Quarter
Horse." The SBRC, which is comprised of approximately 25-35 members,
recommended postponing any decision on the proposed rule change until a
study of the issues could be undertaken."
The proposed change was again on the agenda at the 2009 AQHA
Annual Convention, where the AQHA sponsored a cloning forum.20
Decision on the proposed change, however, was again delayed pending
further study by a cloning task force. 21 Information gathered by the task
force, as well as the results from a member survey wherein an overwhelming
registration-guide.pdf ("A Recorded Clone is not a registered Lipizzan"); FrequentlyAsked Questions,
FAQ_#33, AMERICAN MORGAN HORSE ASSOCIATION, available at
http://www.morganhorse.com/about-morgan/faqs/#33 ("AMHA will not allow registration of any
horses produced by cloning"); 2014 OficialAmerican Paint Horse Association (APHA) Rule Book, RG-
023C & RG-123, AMERICAN PAINT HORSE ASSOCIATION, available at
http://apha.com/docs/default-source/nle-books/2013rulebookindesign-12914.pdf~sfvrsn=0 ("Horses
produced by any cloning process are not eligible for registration"); The American Stud Book Principal
Rules and Requirements, Rule 1D, THEJOCKEY CLUB, available at
https://www.registry.jockeyclub.com/registry.cfm?page=tjcRuleBook ("[A]ny foal resulting from ...
cloning or any other form of genetic manipulation not herein specified, shall not be eligible for
registration").
" American Quarter Horse Association Registration Rules & Regulations, Sec. II, 2,
http://services2.aqha.com/iphonedev/www/sections/sectionll/rules/227.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2014)
(noting it appears that in the wake of the court's ruling, the AQHA may have eliminated Rule 227(a).
Indeed, the language previously found at Rule 227, Horses Not Eligiblefor Registration, has now been
supplanted by Reg. 106, Horses Not Eligible for Registration, available at
http://www.aqha.com/Resources/2014-Handbook.aspx#/Resources/2014-
Handbook/Registration/REG106-Horses-Not-Eligible-For-Registration.aspx).
" AQHA Cloning Timeline, AQHA, available at http://www.aqha.com/AQHA-Cloning-
Lawsuit-Resources/AQHA-Cloning-Timeline.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
19 Id.
20 d.
21 id.
52014-2015]
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majority of respondents indicated they were against cloning, were presented
to the SBRC at the 2010 AQHA Annual Convention.22 Based on this
information, the SBRC recommended the proposed change be denied, and
the membership attending the Convention agreed." Several more
proposed changes to Rule 227(a) were submitted at the 2011, 2012, and
2013 Annual Conventions.24 A were considered by the SBRC, which
recommended that each be denied.25 Soon after the 2012 AQHA Annual
Convention, Abraham and Veneklasen brought suit against the AQHA in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They alleged
that Rule 227(a) is anticompetitive in violation of both Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act and asked that the court enjoin the AQHA from
enforcing its prohibition on the registration of cloned horses and their
offspring.26 Following a jury trial, Abraham and Veneklasen succeeded on
both claims.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, or
conspiracies in restraint of trade.27 Courts have consistently held, however,
that in practice the Sherman Act only prohibits unreasonable restraints.28
Indeed, in its Memorandum Order on the AQHA's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the court explained that Section 1 "calls for a two-step analysis:
(1) whether an arrangement is a contract, combination, or conspiracy; and
(2) whether the contract, combination, or conspiracy unreasonably restrains
interstate or foreign trade."29
With respect to the first step of the analysis, the AQHA asserted in its
Motion for Summary Judgment that it is entitled to single entity protection
because its decision to continue to enforce Rule 227(a) is the decision of a
single entity and not concerted action by and between members of the
22 d.
23 Id.
2 AQHA, supra note 19.25 Id.
' Id. (stating that though the plaintiffs also made claims under the Texas Free Enterprise and
Antitrust Act, this Article focuses on only those brought under Federal law.)
27 15 U.S.C. §1 (2004).
' See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers vs. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289
(1985).
2 Memorandum Order on AQHA's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 4-5, Abraham &
Veneklasen Joint Venture v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n, No. 12 Civ. 00103, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73754 (N.D. Tex. May 24,2013).
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SBRC and the AQHA." Nonetheless, concerted activity alone is not
sufficient to violate Section 1. Concerted activity must result in an
unreasonable restraint on trade. While certain concerted activities are
treated as per se violations of Section 1, most actions are reviewed for
reasonableness under the Rule of Reason; particularly where the action is a
rule of a non-profit association that regulates sporting tournaments, races,
and other contents." The AQHA's enforcement of Rule 227(a) was
submitted to the jury with instructions to consider the issue under the Rule
of Reason, pursuant to which the fact-finder must decide whether the
questioned practice has a legitimate justification.32 Typically, to establish
that the practice has a legitimate justification, the defendant must put
forward evidence of its pro-competitive effects." In its Appeal Brief, the
AQHA submitted arguments that Rule 227(a) was justified by the
AQHA's need to accurately record pedigrees and prevent the spread of
genetic diseases.34 The AQHA did not put forward any arguments that the
enforcement of Rule 227(a) is necessary to preserve the integrity of the
activity and sport of Quarter Horse breeding and racing.3 s
" Brief for Summary Judgment of Defendant at 7, Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. Am.
Quarter Horse Ass'n, No. 12 Civ. 00103 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2013). As further explained in Part III,
infra, the single entity defense exempts an entity from Section 1 antitrust liability because an entity
cannot conspire with itself. See Copper Weld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
t See, e.g., Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n., 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1114-15 (D. Neb.
1981) (citing Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977)); Deesen v. Prof'1
Golfers' Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966), and rehearing
denied, 87 S. Ct. 738 (1967); Blalock v. Ladies Profl Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
Heldman v. U.S. Lawn Tennis Ass'n, 354 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); STP Corp. v. U.S. Auto
Club, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ind. 1968)).
31 Jury Charge at 10, Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n, No. 13-
11043 (5th Cir. Aug. 22, 2013).
3 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117-20 (1984); Worldwide
Basketball and Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004). An alternative approach
is discussed in Part III, infra.
4 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 44.
1s Justifications related to the public interest or the integrity of the industry are generally
insufficient without an economically pro-competitive reason. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v.
U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). Indeed, the antitrust analysis focuses "exclusively on the challenged
restraint's impact on competitive conditions. .. [it is] "not designed to protect the convenience or
financial benefits of the conspirators or even other entities involved in the industry." Gen. Cinema
Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co. Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1267 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Instead, the purpose
of the antitrust analysis is "to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint, it is
not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the
members of an industry." Nat'1Soc'y ofProflEngrs, 435 U.S. at 692. Nonetheless - and as described
further in Section 3, infra - when a standard is put forward as "rule of sport," non-economic
justifications are often considered by the courts.
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Meanwhile, Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization of
"any part of the trade or commerce." 6 Any analysis of a Section 2 claim
commences with a definition of the relevant product and geographic
markets, which are typically the parts of the "trade or commerce" that have
purportedly been monopolized.17  The relevant markets provide the
framework against which economic power can be measured." This was a
threshold issue at trial because the more narrow the market definition, the
greater the market effect. Abraham and Veneklasen defined the relevant
product market as that for the "elite" Quarter Horse. According to the
AQHA's appeal brief, the plaintiffs described the "elite" Quarter Horse
market as being comprised of approximately five-percent of registered
Quarter Horses, horses which are "high quality," "best of the best," and
"top-drawer."" Abraham and Veneklasen further described "elite" Quarter
Horses as coming from desirable bloodlines, having succeeded in
competitions, and fetching high prices.40
Naturally, the AQHA took significant issue with this definition. The
AQHA argued that it provided for no permanent boundaries, as a Quarter
Horse with desirable bloodlines may fetch a high price early in life but later
prove a competitive failure and vice versa.4 In other words, "eliteness" is an
impermanent status. A recent example-albeit not a Quarter Horse-is that
of California Chrome, which in 2014 was considered a serious contender
for the Triple Crown after winning the Kentucky Derby and Preakness.
California Chrome would not have been considered an "elite"
36 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
" Defining the relevant markets is also a necessary part of most analyses under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. As explained by the authors of Antitrust Law Developments (Seventh), "the definition of
the relevant market is so central that it may determine the final outcome of the case. . . .Application of
the rule of reason [under Section 1 of the Sherman Act] . . . typically requires a detailed examination of
the restraint's actual competitive impact in a properly defined relevant market. Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, defining the relevant market is essential to proving monopolization or attempted
monopolization." JONATHAN I. GLEKLEN ET AL.,1 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 569 (7th ed.
2012).
" Id. (citing Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965),
accord Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) ("In order to determine whether
there is a dangerous probability of monopolization, courts have found it necessary to consider the
relevant market and the defendant's ability to lessen or destroy competition in that market.").
' Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 30.
' Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellees at 8-11, Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. Am. Quarter
Horse Ass'n, No. 13-11043 (5th Cir. Feb. 27,2014).
41 Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 30-31.
[Vol. 7 No. 1
TOWARDS THE HEART OF THE SPORT
Thoroughbred at the time his owners bred him for a mere $10,000.42
Today, California Chrome is rumored to be worth over $12 million.43
Regardless, it is apparent that when the definition of the relevant product
market is narrowed to that of the "elite" Quarter Horse, the likelihood of
the AQHA monopolizing that market increases given that AQHA
registration is essential to participation in the most lucrative Quarter Horse
events.
Monopoly power by itself, however, is not unlawful. Rather, monopoly
power is only unlawful when it is acquired or maintained through
anticompetitive conduct-conduct without a legitimate business purpose.44
Thus, the importance of establishing a legitimate business purpose again
becomes crucial. Yet, as with its Section 1 defense, the AQHA did not
assert that Rule 227(a) is necessary as a "rule of sport" to maintain the
integrity of Quarter Horse breeding and racing. Instead, it chose to
concentrate on justifications related to accurate recording and the
prevention of unknown genetic disease, as well as respecting the sentiment
of its membership.
As previously noted, the AQHA's enforcement of Rule 227(a) was
found to violate both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Though the
jury did not award Plaintiffs any damages, the court enjoined the AQHA
from enforcing Rule 227(a) and ordered it to register clones of Quarter
Horses and the offspring of cloned Quarter Horses.45 The injunction has
been stayed pending outcome of the AQHA's appeal to the Fifth Circuit.46
4 Greg Price, Preakness 2014: California Chrome Cost $10,000, But What's The Real Cost Of A
Racehorse?, INT'L Bus. TIMES (May 16, 2014, 10:26 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/preakness-2014-
california-chrome-cost-10000-whats-real-cost-racehorse-1585046.
43 d
" See 21 Cong. Rec. 3151-52 (1890) (Section 2 of the Sherman Act) (explaining that the
Sherman Act was not directed against one "who happens by his skill and energy to command a
legitimate monopoly of a business"). See also Morris Commc'ns. Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d
1288, 1295 (11th Cir.) ("Unlawful monopoly power requires anticompetitive conduct, which is conduct
without a legitimate business purpose be that makes sense only because it eliminates competition.")
(citing Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002); Gen. Indus. Corp. v.
Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 804 (8th Cir. 1987); LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 153-54
(3d Cit. 2003).
45 Final Judgment at 1, Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n, No.
2:12-cv-00103-J (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2013).
' On September 4, 2014, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in the
AQHA's appeal of the District Court's decision. It is not known when the Fifth Circuit might issue its
decision.
2014-2015] 9
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II. REGISTRATION STANDARDS As RULES OF SPORT
A. McHugh v. Australian Jockey Club
A result very different from that of AQHA was reached in McHugh v.
Australian Jockey Club.4 7 There, Bruce McHugh, a Thoroughbred breeder,
former chairman of the Sydney Turf Club, and bookmaker sued the
Australian Jockey Club, the Victoria Racing Club, and the Australian Turf
Club seeking relief from their rules prohibiting registration and racing of
Thoroughbreds produced by artificial insemination. The restrictions at
issue included those rules from the Australian Stud Book, which provide
that in order to be eligible for registration, a foal must be the product of
natural service, and specifically, could not be the product of artificial
breeding. 48 Also at issue were certain Australian Rules of Racing, which
require that a horse be registered with the Australian Stud Book before it
can be entered in any race.49
McHugh argued that because a foal cannot be registered with the
Australian Stud Book if it is the product of artificial insemination, it also
cannot be registered with the Registrar of Racehorses.so As a result, a foal
that is the product of artificial insemination may not race in any race
sanctioned by the Australian Racing Board. McHugh claimed that together
these rules (i) violate §45(2)(b)(ii) of the Australian Competition and
Consumer Act 2010 (the "ACCA"), which prohibits contracts with the
purpose or likely effect of substantially lessening competition, and (ii)
4 McHugb v. Australian Jockey Club Limited (No. 13), (2012) FCR 1441 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.aulau/cases/cth/FCA/2012/1441.html.4 Rules Of The Australian Stud Book, DIV. OF RACING INFO. SERV. AUSTL. PTY. LTD. (RISA),
1, 18-19, http://www.studbook.org.au/DisplayPDF.aspx?ty=RULES_(last updated Sept. 17, 2014).
4 Australian Rules ofRacing, AUSTRALIAN RACING BOARD, 1, 17 (July 1, 2010),
http://www.australianracingboard.com.au/uploadimg/Rules%20010710pdf.
so See McHugh, supra note 48, at 1466.
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constitute an impermissible restraint of trade under the common law.s' The
court rejected Mr. McHugh's arguments in its lengthy decision issued in
December 2012.52
Though Section 45 of the ACCA is not a perfect analogy to Section 1
of the Sherman Act, it is substantially similar.s" Indeed, U.S. antitrust law
begat Australia's Trade Practices Act 1974, the former name of the
ACCA.54 Recognizing the influence of U.S. law, particularly through its
discussion of Brookins v. International Motor Contest Ass'n,55 the court
reasoned that McHugh had failed to establish that the defendants had
given effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement, or understanding
where the provision had the effect, or was likely to have the effect of
substantially lessening competition.s5  The court's reasons for its decision
included:
* The insufficiency of the evidence directed to
establishing substantial lessening of competition;
* The insufficiency of evidence as to the pleaded
contracts, arrangements or understandings;
* The status of the Rules at issues as "Rules of Sport;"
and,
* The sufficiency of evidence concerning the
international consequences of finding the Rules
anticompetitive - that is, if the Rules were overturned
st McHugh, supra note 48, at summary.
52 On October 17, 2014, the Australian High Court denied McHugh's request for special leave to
appeal. The High Court's decision ended McHugh's efforts to overturn the rules which prohibit
registration of Thoroughbreds bred by artificial insemination. See DRF Breeding Staff, Bidfor artificial
insemination ends in Australia, DAILY RACING FORM (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.drf.com/news/bid-
artificial-insemination-ends-australia.
53 See id.; Legislation, AUSTL. CONSUMER LAW,
http://www.consumerlaw.gov.au/content/content.aspx?doc=the-acl/1egislation.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2014).
54 See Paul G. Scott, The Impact of US Antitrust on Aspects of New Zealand Competition Law
(unpublished paper) available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload.documents/PaulScott.pdf); Legislation, supra note 53.
s Brookins v. Int'l Motor Contest Ass'n, 219 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2000).
s6 See McHugh, supra note 48, at 1524-25. (With respect to the common law restraint of trade
claim, the court reasoned that Mr. McHugh had failed to establish that the restraint was unreasonable at
the time it was imposed in 1947, particularly given that Mr. McHugh accepted the reasonableness of the
alleged restraints at the time they were imposed many decades ago to prevent the attribution of incorrect
paternity to a thoroughbred horse.)
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in Australia, then the status of Australian
Thoroughbred races would be downgraded.s7
Though it is not apparent whether the court's conclusion was
dependent on a balancing of all its reasons or whether any one of its reasons
alone would serve as the basis for dismissing the applicant's claims, this
Article is primarily concerned with the court's treatment of the contested
provisions as "rules of sport." The provisions' status as "rules of sport"
critically bore on how the court analyzed whether the impugned provisions
had or were likely to have "the effect of substantially lessening competition
once their offsetting, pro-competitive benefits had been accounted for."s"
Arguably, the rules' status was determinative to the court's ultimate
question of whether their enforcement violated Australia's antitrust laws.
The primary concern for the court in conferring rule of sport status
was whether the rules being challenged were significant to the sport of
Thoroughbred racing.59 Keeping this in mind, the court referred to-and to
a certain extent was influenced by-the U.S. Court of Appeals' decision in
Brookins." Given the McHugh court's reference to and reliance on Brookins,
this decision deserves exploration.
In Brookins, the automobile defendant racing association, IMCA, had
banned from its races the use of certain transmissions manufactured by the
plaintiffs.' The plaintiffs argued that exclusion of their transmissions from
IMCA-sanctioned races had an adverse effect on competition by depriving
drivers of less expensive, safer, better-performing products. The court
rejected this argument, calling the plaintiffs' analysis flawed.62 It found that
the IMCA restriction, rather than having an adverse effect on competition,
merely "help[s] define a game or sport in which the end product is a form
" McHugh, supra note 48, at summary.
5 Id. at 1445.
5 Id. at 11446.
* Brookins, 219 F.3d 849.
6 Id. at 851-52.
Id. at 853.
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of competition among drivers."" McHugh found the following from
Brookins particularly insightful:
Without question, the way IMCA defines the rules for
modified car racing will exclude some types of equipment.
But the exclusion is an incidental and inevitable by-product
of defining the game. A rule making body's impact on
equipment manufacturers will vary depending on the
popularity of the game, and the extent to which its rules are
followed by the game's players - in other words, the extent
to which they are seen as rules of the game itself, rather
than rules of that body's league of game-players.64
Though McHugh conceded that it would need to consider Brookins
carefully given the distinct statutory context of U.S. antitrust law, there is
little doubt that the foregoing language shaped the court's question as to
"whether the impugned provisions deal only with an irrelevant, because
[sic] not performance-affecting, mode of conception" as Mr. McHugh
contended, or "whether the method of conception, as between natural cover
and artificial insemination, is an attribute ofthe sport of Thoroughbred racing,"
as the defendants contended.s
In determining the answer, McHugh placed considerable weight on
evidence that suggested a core feature of Thoroughbred racing is the
breeding of its horses by natural cover, without which a "large part of the
fabric of the industry" would be lost. 6 Though the court rejected evidence
suggesting the difficulty of conception by natural cover (as opposed to the
difficultly of breeding a champion) contributes to an attribute of the sport,"7
it recognized that breeding by natural cover remained a part of the
"mystique and inherent skill of Thoroughbred racing."" In response to
61 Id. at 853-54 (explaining that "in these circumstances [where the exclusion is incidental result
of defining the rules of the game], IMCA rules are not the kind of 'naked restraint' on competition that
justify foregoing the market analysis normally required in Section 1 rule-of-reason cases").
"McHugh, supra note 48, at 1 1449 (quoting Brookins, 219 F.3d at 853) (emphasis added).
6s Id. at 1452 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 1457.
6 1 Id. at 1458.
61 Id. at 1457.
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McHugh's contention that the impugned provisions merely set forth who
might participate in the game, the court "rejected any distinction between
rules that define the game and rules that define who may play the game.""9
It reasoned that many sports are defined by who plays in the game, and that
regardless; the horses themselves do not play the game of Thoroughbred
racing.o The court concluded that horses are more like equipment in the
game of Thoroughbred racing, rather than players." Finally, and perhaps
most significantly, the court recognized that that it should provide a not
insignificant amount of deference to the governing organizations making
the rules as it is those organizations which have to judge "what is in the best
interests of the sport in terms of its appeal" by taking into account the
opinions of its "breeders, owners, punters, and other spectators."72 Indeed,
this propriety of affording such deference is explored further in Section 4.
Considering the evidence, McHugh found that the impugned
provisions "contribute to the nature and quality of the sport and are an
attribute of it."" Drawing further upon the comparison of horses as
sporting equipment, the court found that:
[T]horoughbred racing, is defined by reference to breeding
so the mode of conception or "manufacture" is closer to the
heart of the sport than, say, a prescription in tennis as to the
mode of manufacture of a tennis racquet so as to require
that racquets be handmade. In the case of thoroughbred
racing the existing construct, involving the existing and
unchallenged rules about breeding lines, involves humans
racing thoroughbred horses bred from those breeding lines
so as to exclude thoroughbred horses bred from those lines
by artificial insemination.
Thus the impugned provisions have procompetitive effects in
that they contribute to the interest of those who participate in
69 Id. at 1460.
70 McHugh, supra note 48, at 1460.
nId. at 1461.
nId. at 1454.
7 Id. at 1463.
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the sport whether as breeders, owners, punters or other
spectators.7 4
Though the court was "not able to quantify either the extent of the
contribution of the impugned provisions to the total value of the sport or
the extent to which, if those provisions were held to be contrary to §45, the
demand [for the sport] would diminish," it was still "satisfied that there
would be reduced competition in the absence of the impugned
provisions." 5  Accordingly, it followed for the court that horses bred by
artificial insemination could not be competitors in a market defined by
breeding by natural cover.
McHugh's findings benefit from clarification. As previously noted, the
court's analysis of the "impugned provisions" as "rules of sport" was
intended to determine whether the restriction on registration of horses bred
by artificial insemination had or was likely to have the effect of substantially
lessening competition once the restriction's off-setting procompetitive
benefits were accounted for.n In its analysis, the court found that the
restriction, which was close to the "heart" of Thoroughbred racing,
produced certain procompetitive effects by contributing to the interests of
the sport's participants.
It is worth noting that in determining whether the restriction was
likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition, the court did
not explicitly weigh and balance its procompetitive effects against any anti-
competitive effects. Presumably, that is because earlier in its opinion the
court found no evidence to support the applicant's contention that the
restriction had any anti-competitive effects. It is not clear why given the
7 Id at 1463-64 (emphasis added).
s Id. at 1464.
76 McHugh, supra note 48, at 1465.
n Id. at 1445.
" Id. at 1463-64.
7 "Of themselves the ASB Provisions do not have an effect on competition in the relevant market
since they do no more than state which horses may be entered in that register. By themselves, the ASB
Provisions do not relevantly restrict or prohibit a thoroughbred horse from racing in a thoroughbred
race." Id. at 1429. "[T]he applicant did not establish any substantial lessening of competition as he did
not establish there were likely to be meaningful changes in the decisions made by mare and/or stallion
owners as a result of the removal of the impugned provisions. The applicant did not establish that if
artificial insemination were available for thoroughbred breeding then breeding costs would be lower to a
degree which was significant in light of the overall costs of the breeding decision to be made; that mare
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lack of any anticompetitive effect the court felt it necessary to establish the
provisions' procompetitive benefits. Perhaps the court merely wished to
engage in a fulsome analysis. However, the lack of anticompetitive effect
flowing from the prohibition on artificial insemination may be significant to
the court's ultimate finding that without the restriction there might be
reduced competition in the sport. o In other words, because the restriction
goes to the heart of sport-because it helps define the sport-its absence
might deter participants from engaging in the sport if without the
restriction Thoroughbred racing is less exciting, less engaging, or simply not
the same sport its participants and spectators have come to know.
We do not discuss McHugh for the purpose of redefining the antitrust
analysis under either Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act. In fact, no
redefinition is needed given that the analytical construct of McHugh is
largely consistent with other "rules of sport" cases where the court applies
the Rule of Reason to determine whether the rule at issue runs afoul of
antitrust laws. Rather, McHugh is primarily offered to understand that
breed registry standards are no different than any other rules of sports
which specify what equipment may be utilized-rules that have typically
been upheld by U.S. courts under analyses similar to McHugh." Brookins is
one such case. Because these "rules of sport" cases have been examined in
depth by other authors, only a few more are reviewed below for the purpose
of helping the reader understand guiding precedents.
owners would so expand the geographic range in which they sought stallion services; or that owners of
high quality stallions would so expand their output." Id. at 1433. "It is not enough to find that, for
example, the costs of transporting a broodmare to stud matters to some of those breeders who gave
evidence and from that finding to conclude that giving effect to the impugned provisions would or
would be likely to substantially lessen competition." Id. at 1437. "It follows from my findings that the
applicant has failed to establish the claimed increase in competition in the breeding market from the
removal of the restrictions in that market that the applicant has not established there would be the flow
on effects in the acquisition market, leading to an increase in competition in that market, for which he
contended. Further, I am not satisfied that if Al were permitted in Australia there is likely to be an
increase in the number of high-quality yearlings put up for sale or that prices were likely to be lower for
high-quality yearlings. I am not satisfied that there would be significant demand for Al-bred
thoroughbreds in the thoroughbred acquisition market or that international and domestic purchasers
seeking to breed or race in Australia only would be likely to purchase Al-bred thoroughbreds." Id. at
1443.
0 Id. at 5 1464.
"' See John E. Lopatka, Antitrust and Sports Equipment Standards: Winners and Whiners, 54
ANTITRUST BULL. 4 at 3-4 (June 2, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1413172 (explaining that antitrust claims have
rarely succeeded on rules defining equipment standards in sport).
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B. Reviewing Antitrust Precedents on "Rules ofSport"
In Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n,82 the plaintiff
manufacturer of tennis racquets challenged the United States Tennis
Association's (USTA) decision to .adopt the International Tennis
Federation's definition of a tennis racquet, a definition which had the effect
of excluding the use of "double-strung" racquets from USTA-sanctioned
tennis tournaments. The manufacturer alleged that the USTA conspired
with others to restrain competition in the sale of tennis racquets in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court, recognizing the need for
collective action in organized sports, analyzed the USTA's actions under the
Rule of Reason pursuant to the 4-part inquiry articulated in Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange." Under the reasoning of Silver, the Rule of Reason
inquiry focuses on aspects that differ slightly from the approach applied by
most courts. Rather than weighing the restriction's procompetitive benefits
against its anticompetitive effects, a court asks:
(1) whether collective action is intended to accomplish an
end consistent with the policy justifying self-
regulation;
(2) whether the action is reasonably related to that goal;
(3) whether such action is no more extensive than
necessary; and
(4) whether the association provides procedural safeguards
which assure that the restraint is not arbitrary and
which furnish a basis for judicial review.84
Though the court did not explain why it chose to avoid the traditional
approach to Rule of Reason analysis, it did note that the inquiry from Silver
is applied in "areas where a need for self-regulation is inherent in the
82 Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 511 F.Supp. 1103 (D. Neb. 1981).
8 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
* Gunter Harz, 511 F. Supp. at 1116.
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industry," including professional and amateur sports.8  Applying this
inquiry, the court found that the rule banning double-strung racquets was
adopted to address the USTA's goal of preserving the character and
integrity of the game of tennis." The court concluded that this was a
legitimate goal, that the rule was reasonably related to achieving that goal,
and that the rule was no more extensive than necessary to serve that goal."
Importantly, the court emphasized that in the absence of evidence
demonstrating that the sanctioning organization acted in an unlawful,
arbitrary, or malicious manner, the court must provide that organization
with a certain amount of latitude in determining what is a legitimate goal
and the rules appropriate to reach that goal." Quoting from STP Corp. v.
United States Auto Club, the court emphasized that membership
organizations, such as the USTA, "have the right to adopt such rules to
protect their very existence."" The court also addressed the fourth inquiry,
rejecting the idea that the actions of the USTA must be a "model of
procedural due process."" Rather, its notice and comment period, which
provided every interested party an opportunity to be heard, was sufficient;9'
the USTA was not required to provide the plaintiff with a personal
hearing." Significantly, the court recognized that while the ban negatively
impacted the plaintiff manufacturer's ability to compete in the market for
tennis racquets, this effect was merely "incidental to the USTA's primary
purpose in promoting tennis competition."93
In Weight-Rite Golf Corp. v. United States Golf Ass'n, the plaintiff
manufacturer of golf shoes alleged that the United States Golf Association
(USGA), a non-profit association of golf courses and golf clubs, ran afoul of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by determining that the use of
"s The traditional approach to the Rule of Reasons as compared to the alternative approach set
forth in Gunter Harz is discussed again in Section 3, including to what extent these two approaches
might be inconsistent with one another. See Silver, 373 U.S. at 362.
' Gunter Harz, 511 F. Supp. at 1119.
8'Id. at 1118-19.
" Id. at 1117-18.
"STP Corp. v. U.S. Auto Club, Inc., 286 F.Supp. 146, 151 (S.D. Ind. 1968).
* Gunter Harz, 511 F. Supp. at 1121.
P at 1122.
3 Id. at 1124.
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Weight-Rite shoes violated its Rules of Golf. 94 The USGA's Rules are
typically followed in professional and amateur golf tournaments, even by
entities such as the PGA Tour, which conduct non-USGA golf
competitions.s Because the plaintiff completely failed to demonstrate that
the USGA had engaged in a conspiracy with its member clubs-indeed, the
plaintiff did not even make this assertion-the court could have rested its
decision to dismiss the Section 1 claim on this failure alone."6 The court,
however, proceeded and considered the plaintiffs claim under the Rule of
Reason. To succeed on its claim, Weight-Rite had to present evidence that
the USGA's determination that Weight-Rite shoes did not conform to the
Rules of Golf injured competition in the U.S. golf shoe market. The only
evidence offered by Weight-Rite, however, was its suggestion that the
USGA had the power to decrease the marketability of certain types of golf
shoes and that as a result of the USGA's interpretation of its Rules of Golf,
Weight-Rite shoes had been returned and discontinued by many retailers."
These allegations were insufficient, and the court emphasized that injury to
oneself as a competitor is not injury to competition." With no evidence to
controvert the USGA's assertion that the purpose of its rule was nothing
other than to "preserve the traditions of the game and to insure that a
player's score is the product of his skills, rather than his equipment," the
plaintiffs claim failed under the Rule of Reason." Indeed, given the lack of
any anticompetitive effect, there was no need for the court to consider what,
if any, procompetitive effects result from the USGA's enforcement of its
rules.
Another more recent claim involving the USGA was brought in
Windage, LLC v. United States Gof Ass'n,'0o by a manufacturer of wind
gauges used in golf. The USGA banned the plaintiffs device from
competition because it did not conform to a rule of golf that prohibited any
94Weight-Rite Golf Corp. v. U.S. Golf Ass'n, 766 F. Supp. 1104,1106 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
s Id. at 1108.
96 See id. at 1108-09.
97 Id. at 1110-11.
9 Id. at 1110.
9 Id. at 1111 (quoting the Affidavit of Frank Thomas).
" Windage, LLC v. U.S. Golf Ass'n, No. Civ. 07-4897, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51065 (D.
Minn. July 2, 2008).
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artificial device that could be used to affect play.'0 ' In turn, the plaintiff
filed suit alleging that the USGA conspired with its members and affiliates
to boycott the plaintiffs wind gauge, and in doing so, restrained trade and
inhibited development and research.'o2 The court dismissed the plaintiffs
Section 1 claim based on its failure to sufficiently allege an agreement.o In
an attempt to create a plausible inference of an agreement, the plaintiff
asserted that that the USGA had applied its rules in an arbitrary and
inconsistent manner, allowing the use of laser and GPS devices that
measured distance, but banning the plaintiffs device that measured wind.'04
In dismissing this argument, the court cited to Brookins and emphasized:
So long as [the USGA] made game-defining rules
decisions based upon its purpose as a sports organization,
an antitrust court need not be concerned with the
rationality or fairness of those decisions. Irrational
decisions and unfair treatment of suppliers will result in an
unpopular game, and players and spectators will take their
entertainment dollars elsewhere. 05
The language here is significant. Recall that the first two factors of the
four-factor inquiry outlined in Gunter Harz require the restriction at issue
be "intended to accomplish an end consistent with the policy justifying self-
regulation" and be "reasonably related to that goal."0 6 These factors clearly
call for rationality. Indeed, even though the McHugh court does not speak
precisely in terms of rationality, it goes to great lengths to determine
whether the rule prohibiting artificial insemination is a rule that defines the
sport of Thoroughbred racing or merely some rule that was instituted by its
participants. Yet, both Windage and Brookins reject rationality and in doing
so suggest some significantly lesser standard is appropriate. While it is
'01 Id. at *3-4.
102 Id. at *4.
103 Id. at *9-10.
104 Id. at *10-11.
10s Id. at *11 (citing Brookins v. Intl Motor Contest Ass'n, 219 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2000)).
10 Gunter Harz, 511 F. Supp. at 1116.
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unclear what precisely constitutes this lesser standard, it may have to do
with whether the organization's decision was tainted by coercion.07
In Warrior Sports, Inc. v. NCAA, the plaintiff was a manufacturer of
lacrosse sticks.'o It filed a complaint against the NCAA after the NCAA
amended its rule regarding the type of lacrosse sticks that could be used in
NCAA competition; the NCAA's amendment had the effect of rendering
all of Warrior's current lacrosse stick heads illegal.o' Warrior contended
that the NCAA conspired with its competitors in making this amendment
and in doing so inhibited competition and innovation in the lacrosse stick
market and thereby violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act."10 The case is
worth mentioning for two reasons. First, the court engaged, at least
preliminarily, in Rule of Reason analysis, demonstrating that courts will
continue to look at antitrust challenges to "rules of sport" under the Rule of
Reason. Second, although the court recognized that Warrior's claim must
be reviewed under the Rule of Reason, the court did not undertake a full
Rule of Reason analysis because Warrior failed to meet its initial burden of
demonstrating anticompetitive effect."' Significantly, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that Warrior failed to meet its burden of demonstrating injury to
competition, rather than injury only to itself, because the rule at issue
"applies to all manufacturers, including Warrior, in exactly the same way,"
and thus, "Warrior may compete in the market on the same footing as all
other participants.""' This is a notable case because the court found that an
equally applicable rule eliminates the possibility of anti-competitive effect.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ANTITRUST ANALYSIS WHEN
STANDARDS FOR REGISTRATION ARE CONSIDERED "RULES OF SPORT"
07 Brookins, 219 F.3d at 854 (The court suggests that evidence of coercion in setting the
restriction would be sufficient. "[I]f the rules decisions are corrupted by coercion from competitors of
the disadvantaged supplier, we have a different antitrust setting . " but "[t]here is no evidence that
the IMCA's rulings were made for reasons other than its overall purpose to define a set of rules for a
popular game.").
'os Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 623 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2010).
109 Id.
no Id. at 285.
uxId. at 285-86.
112 Id. at 286.
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Considering breed registration standards as "rules of sport" and
equating the actions of a breed registry to those of a sports league carries
with it a number of implications for the antitrust analysis, some of which
can be gleaned from the discussion in Section II. Although the
implications likely pervade all facets of the antitrust analysis, this Article
focuses on three: (A) the establishment of an agreement or conspiracy and
the single entity defense; (B) the definition of the product market and the
distinction, if any, between sports and entertainment; and perhaps most
significantly, (C) the application of the Rule of Reason and the latitude
afforded by the courts to defendant organizations.
A. The Establishment ofan Agreement or Conspiracy and the Single Entity
Defense
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the Supreme Court
held that a parent corporation and its subsidiary are not capable of entering
into a conspiracy for purposes of antitrust liability.' Thus, as a matter of
law, a single entity cannot violate Section 1. Sports leagues often assert the
single entity defense, arguing that the league is exempt from antitrust
liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. As explained by Professor
Feldman, sports leagues have "long viewed the single-entity defense as the
antitrust 'holy grail,' because it shields them from attack under Section 1."1114
Indeed, the single entity defense was asserted by the AQHA at the trial
level and raised it again on appeal. As noted in Part I of this Article, the
AQHA asserted the single entity defense based on its argument that
because "there was no concerted agreement within the SBRC, but rather a
mutual conclusion reached by individual members that the Rule should
remain in place for the benefit of AQHA, the decision was made by a single
entity incapable of conspiring.""t5
Of course, the AQHA's single-entity defense failed in the district
court. Indeed, the single-entity defense has succeeded only under limited
113 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
" Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for Sports Leagues:
American Needle and the Supreme Court's Opportunity to Reject a Flawed Defense, 2009 WIsc. L. REV. 835,
837 (2009).
115 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 11.
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circumstances, and the issue of whether a sports league can act as a single
entity has been fraught with debate for the past half-century."' Most
recently, in American Needle v. NFL, the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify this issue."' Although the Supreme Court did not provide a simple,
one-sentence rule, it made clear what it believed were indicators of
concerted activity. According to the Court, the key factor is whether the
entity represents "separate economic actors pursuing separate economic
interests" so as to "deprive the marketplace of independent centers of
decision-making."" 8
American Needle concerned NFL teams which together agreed to grant
an exclusive license to one company to produce all teams' fan apparel
containing the teams' logos. The Court explained that each NFL team was
an independently owned business, with a separate consciousness.'19
Though these teams cooperate in some respects such as in the scheduling of
games, they otherwise do not have common objectives when they compete
with one another for fans, players, managers, coaches, and revenue. 20
Further, these independently owned teams are potentially competing
suppliers in the marketplace for intellectual property; thus, when
conducting their licensing activities, the teams are not pursuing the interests
of the NFL but their own individual interests.' 2 ' Such restraints by
individual entities must be evaluated for Section 1 liability under the Rule
of Reason.
The Court found that the reason for the teams' cooperation is not
relevant to determining whether their actions are independent or
concerted.' 22 Rather, what is important is whether that cooperation is
essential for the teams to compete.'' While the scheduling of games is a
concerted activity essential to competition, cooperation in the licensing and
sale of apparel is not. 2 4 Although the Court recognized that it "generally
116 Feldman, supra note 115, at 846.
1 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
s Id. at 195.
11 Id. at 196.
120 Id. at 196-97.
121 Id. at 197.
122 Id. at 199.
Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 203.
124 Id. at 202-03.
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treat[s] agreement within a single firm as independent action on the
presumption that the components of the firm will act to maximize the
firm's profits," it also noted that in certain situations, such as that in
American Needle, "agreements made within a firm can constitute concerted
action . . . ."12 The Court emphasized that "separate economic actors" and
"independent centers of decision making" help draw this distinction but
declined to provide more precise guidance as to what combination of
competitors would be treated as a single entity for purposes of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court's lack of guidance leaves lower courts with the
difficult task of consistently differentiating between independent and
concerted action. Lower courts will undoubtedly (continue to) struggle to
define the boundaries of the entity at issue, particularly in the context of
sports leagues, where the members of the league must necessarily cooperate
with one another if there is to be the product of competition at all. This is
significant for breed registries, in which the membership (individual
breeders) must cooperate if they are to preserve the pedigree of the breed at
issue. This cooperation includes defining what characteristics of the animal
constitute the breed standard and engaging in competitive events to
promote the breed standard. While one might argue that the exclusion of
clones is not necessary to preserve the Quarter Horse-and in fact, this was
an argument put forth by the plaintiffs in AQHA-that issue is not relevant
for purposes of determining the applicability of the single entity defense.
Pursuant to American Needle, what is critical is whether the cooperation is
essential to create the product.126 For purposes of the single entity defense,
the question is whether cooperation amongst individual breeders vis-i-vis
the breed registry is necessary to preserve the breed of the Quarter Horse.
If so, then defining the Quarter Horse to exclude clones is merely an
incidental by-product of that cooperati6n, and the single-entity defense
should exempt the breed registry from Section 1 scrutiny.
B. Defining the Product Market and the Distinction (if any) Between Sports
and Entertainment
125 Id. at 200.126 Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 195.
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As noted earlier, the determination of the relevant product market is
critical to establishing injury to competition. Anti-competitive effect
decreases as the product market widens. On the other hand, anti-
competitive effect increases as the product market narrows. When
discussing sports leagues, a question often arises as to whether a particular
sport competes within a broader entertainment market that includes not
only other types of sport but other types of entertainment. If so, a
restriction within a particular sport will have very little anticompetitive
effect. In this respect, some commentators have asserted that most courts
have defined the product market in sports cases much too narrowly.'
A minority of courts that have recognized a more expansive definition
deserve brief mention. These courts recognize that sports and other forms
of entertainment may be part of the same relevant market. For instance, in
Theatre Party Associates, Inc. v. Schubert Organization,28 the court suggested
that "hit" Broadway shows do not constitute a separate submarket and
questioned why the relevant market could not include the other forms of
entertainment such as the opera or the ballet or even sports. 2 9 Similarly, in
his dissent of NFL v. North American Soccer League,"0 Justice Rehnquist
noted that "NFL owners are joint venturers who product a product,
professional football, which competes with other sports and other forms of
127 See, e.g., Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use andAbuse of Section 1 to
Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REV. 219, 257 n. 135 (1984); Jerry Glick,
Professional Sports Franchise Movements and The Sherman Act: When and Where Teams Should be Able to
Move, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55, 77-78 (1983).
128 Theatre Party Assocs., Inc. v. Shubert Org., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
.' Id. at 154-55. Perhaps significantly, the court states that the "fact that plaintiff chose to
operate in a single market the most popular Broadway shows - does not make it a relevant market for
antitrust purposes." Id. Likewise, plaintiffs in AQHA have chosen to operate in the Quarter Horse
market. However, there exist other breed registries and performance associations that permit the
registration and participation of clones. Such breed registries include the Studbook Zangersheide and
the Anglo European Studbook. See Stallion Selection 2012: Zangersheide launches the selection season,
ZANGERSHCEIDE, http://www.zangersheide.com/en/Stallion-Selection-2012 (last visited Sept. 17,
2014); Joris De Brabander: WES is trendsetter', ANGLO EUROPEAN STUDBOOK, (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://angloeuropeanstudbook.co.uk/interviews/i2/joris-de-brabander-aes-is-trendsetter. Performance
associations that welcome clones in their events include the National Barrel Horse Association, the
National Cutting Horse Association, and Argentinian polo. See Facts about the NBHA, NAT'L BARREL
HORSE ASSoc., http://www.barrelracers.com/nbha-facts.php (last visited Sept. 17, 2014); NCHA Says
Clones Can Be Shown, QUARTER HORSE NEws,
http://www.quarterhorsenews.com/index.php/cutting/cutting-outside-the-pen/4296-ncha-says-clones-
can-be-shown.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2014); Rory Carroll, Argentinian polo readies itselffor attack of
the clones, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/05/argentinian-
polo-clones-player/.
13 Hill v. United States, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
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entertainment in the entertainment market.""' In Windage, the court
mentioned "entertainment dollars" when arguing that the effect of adopting
irrational rules of sport would be to reduce that sport's audience.' 2 More
recently, in its decision on American Needle, the Seventh Circuit recognized
that the NFL competes with other forms of entertainment for a limited
audience; "Simply put, nothing in § 1 prohibits the NFL teams from
cooperating so the league can compete against other entertainment
providers."'
These cases aside, courts have generally chosen more narrow
definitions. This makes it more difficult for sports leagues' standards to
pass antitrust muster, because when the relevant product market is defined
to exclude both other sports and other forms of entertainment, then the
market effects are multiplied. Nevertheless, Professor Lazaroff advocates
that a more narrow approach is more consistent with both economics and
antitrust precedent. 3 4 Concentrating on the economic analysis, Lazaroff
explains that sports fans do not respond to increases or decreases in ticket
pricing in a way that suggests cross-elasticity of demand between one sport
and another or between sports and other forms of entertainment.' He
notes, "[m]any movie attendees may also enjoy watching sports, but it does
not follow that a price increase in movie tickets would result in a significant
shift of patronage to live sports events."'36
The AQHA did not argue that the relevant product market expands
beyond that of the Quarter Horse to include other equestrian breeds or
even other forms of entertainment. It has not been established whether
there is cross-elasticity of demand between one breed of horse and another
or between horse breeding generally and other entertainment activities.
This argument as to whether the Quarter Horse market should have been
broadened to include other breeds or other forms of entertainment could
131 Id. at 1077 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132 Windage, LLC v. U.S. Golf Ass'n, No. Civ. 07-4897, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51065, at *11
(D. Minn. July 2, 2008).
.. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd on other
grounds, 557 U.S. 183 (2010).
'3 Daniel E. Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis and Sports Leagues: Re-examining the Threshold Questions,
20 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 953, 979 (1988).
1s Id. at 977-78.
13 Id. at 982.
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certainly be explored, although it is not within the scope of this Article to
do so. What is more relevant to this Article is whether the Quarter Horse
product market should have been narrowed to include a submarket for the
"elite" American Quarter Horse, as asserted by the plaintiffs in AQHA.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,"7 the Supreme Court introduced
the concept of submarkets within markets:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined
by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-
elasticity of demand between the product itself and
substitutes for it. However, within this broad market, well-
defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves,
constitute markets for antitrust purposes. The boundaries
of such a submarket may be determined by examining such
practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the
submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's
peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production
facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to
price changes, and specialized vendors.'
Lazaroff provides a good explanation of the potential submarkets existing
for sporting equipment when he states:
Considering the fact that titanium golf clubs with graphite
shafts often retail for several hundred dollars and many
times the price of other clubs, one could reasonably
contend that they constitute a relevant submarket separate
from all other golf clubs. Similarly the cost and quality of
m Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S 294 (1962).
.s Id at 322.
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the best aluminum baseball bats separate them from the
lower cost, less powerful wooden models.139
Lazaroff goes on, however, to emphasize:
[D]ifferences in price and quality do not necessarily remove
products from the market. Consumers may factor in the
price and quality differentials when making a purchase and
opt for either the high quality/higher price item or the
lower quality/cheaper product. The products may still be
competing for the consumers' dollars. At some point the
differences in price and quality may suggest separate
markets, but products need not be identical in price and
quality to compete for the consumers' dollars. . . . the
buying patterns of consumers should ultimately determine
the relevant markets.140
Plaintiffs in AQHA submitted evidence that while demand for "non-
elite" Quarter Horses is greatly dependent on price, demand for "elite"
Quarter Horses is not price sensitive.141 Included within Plaintiffs' evidence
was testimony from "one breeder that a five percent increase in price of an
'elite' Quarter Horse would not deter him from making a purchase" and
that "he would rather buy two $100,000 horses than twenty $10,000
horses." 42 It is questionable, however, whether the testimony of one
breeder is indicative of the buying patterns of consumers of Quarter Horses
as a whole or merely an indication of his personal preference. The AQHA's
expert in valuing racehorses testified that his clients ultimately want to
purchase a winning horse and that his job is to identify that horse.143 His
opinion was that the "best horse" is not synonymous with the most
expensive horse and offered up examples of winners purchased for very low
..' Daniel E. Lazaroff, Sports Equipment Standardization: An Antitrust Analysis, 34 GA. L. REV.
137, 158 (1999).
'4 Id. at 158-59.
14 Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 41, at 35.
142 Id. at 36.
143 Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 25-26.
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prices. This is consistent with Lazaroff's explanation that products of
different qualities and values may compete for the same consumers.
Of course, even accepting that there exists a submarket for the "elite"
Quarter Horse, an issue remains as to whether the AQHA is dominated by
this submarket's participants. This inquiry is important because it colors
any analysis pursuant to the Rule of Reason, whereby the court must
determine whether the restriction is reasonably related to achieving a
legitimate goal. There was no dispute that only four members of the SBRC
were owners and breeders of "elite" Quarter Horses, as defined by
Plaintiffs.145 However, it was hotly contested whether those four members
dominated the remaining members to the extent that the remaining
members were unable to reach independent decisions on registering
clones.14 6
C. Applying the Rule of Reason with Deference
Once the relevant markets are defined, courts typically apply the Rule
of Reason-as opposed to per se scrutiny-to standards set by sports
organizations.147 As a general matter, there are two approaches to analyzing
Rule of Reason claims. The predominant approach was espoused in
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, where the Court
balanced the standard's anticompetitive effects with its procompetitive
effects.148 Under this multi-factor approach, the plaintiff must first
demonstrate that the prohibition at issue produces significant anti-
competitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets.
The defendant must then establish a legitimate justification for the
144 id.
15Id at 12.
14 Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 41, at 29-30.
147 Per se analysis is appropriate where agreements and practices are so plainly anticompetitive
and lack redeeming virtue that they can be presumed illegal without further examination. See Nat'l Soc'y
of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); N. Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979); Hatley v. Am. Quarter
Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 1977) ("In an industry which necessarily requires some
interdependence and cooperation, the per se rule should not be applied indiscriminately. In some
sporting enterprises a few rules are essential to survival.").
148 Nat'1 Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S 679 (1978).
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prohibition and show that the prohibition has procompetitive effects.
Justifications typically offered include the following:
(i) Restriction ensures product exists at all;
(ii) Restriction promotes competitive balance;
(iii) Restriction prevents free-riding; and
(iv) Restriction ensures economic efficiencies.149
As to the argument that the restriction ensures that the product exists
at all, it is axiomatic to the purpose of the breed registry that it set forth
parameters for breed conformities. At the broadest and most obvious level,
no one can sensibly argue that the AQHA must register the foal of a
Quarter Horse and donkey (i.e., a "mule") as a Quarter Horse or face
antitrust scrutiny. Of course, such distinctions become much less obvious
when discussing the registration of clones that genetically conform to the
breed standard.'s Indeed, a cloned Quarter Horse is genetically
indistinguishable from its non-cloned donor. Nonetheless, the method of
conception (or manufacture) seems to beg a different question, and the
reasoning of McHugh is instructive on this issue. There, the court accepted
that natural cover defined Thoroughbred breeding and racing-that the
method of conception went to the "heart of the sport."'' McHugh
acknowledges that what defines the breed standard of a Thoroughbred is
not only its genetic markers but also the method by which it was conceived.
Of course, it may be more difficult for a breed registry such as the AQHA,
which allows the registration of foals born of artificial insemination and
embryo transfer, to argue that the method of conception defines the
Quarter Horse. This may be a better argument left for breed registries such
149 James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims After
American Needle, 21 MARQ SPORTS L. REV. 518, 530 (2011); see also Nat'l Collegiate Athletics Ass'n v.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (recognizing that in certain industries "horizontal restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all"); Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v.
Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008).
"' Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 41, at 48 (Plaintiffs in AQHA repeated that the donor
horse and its clone were merely "twins separated in time.").
1s1 McHugh v Australian Jockey Club Ltd. (No. 13) [2012] FCA 1441, 1463 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2012/1441.html.
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as the Jockey Club, which has consistently required natural cover as a
condition precedent to registration.
As to competitive balance being a procompetitive justification, courts
have explained that this concept reflects "the expected equality of
opportunity to compete and prevail on the field. Competitive balance also
relates to the fans' expectations that each team is a potential champion -
i.e., that each Club has a reasonable opportunity to win each game and also
compete for a championship."'52 In the context of equestrian breed
registries and their related competitions, competitive balance may be
maintained through genetic diversity. Proponents of cloning may assert
that SCNT allows the introduction of DNA into the gene pool that
otherwise would not be available, such as those of a gelded horse. The fear,
of course, is that while cloning may introduce otherwise unavailable DNA,
that DNA will be only that of super "winners," creating a field of
Secretariats and Man O'Wars in Thoroughbred racing. Undoubtedly, a
large part of what makes Thoroughbred racing exciting is the field variety
and that on any given day, an underdog could win.
Free riding exists where one is able to benefit disproportionately from
the efforts of others, which may lead to inefficiencies in the market if
investors are no longer incentivized to promote and develop the product.1s3
Breeders spend considerable sums in developing a winner, whether that is
through choosing the right mating combination of broodmare and stud
horse, training the resulting foal, or both. If one can simply have a winner
by cloning a previous winner, investments that have been made in
traditional breeding and training methods are made worthless. Indeed, can
it be said that the "breeder" choosing to clone a winner is doing anything
other than free riding on the investments made by previous breeders?
As to assurance of economic efficiencies, antitrust laws aim to
maximize consumer welfare through the economic efficiency of markets by
preventing limits on competition.154  Restraints, however, are not always
152 Salvino, 542 F.3d at 333.
's See id. at 340.
154 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 405-06
(Basic Books, 1978). Judge Richard Posner agrees that "[alimost everyone professionally involved in
antitrust today - whether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed observer .... agrees that
the only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, . . . ." and by "economic
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anticompetitive, and in certain situations restraints can increase economic
efficiency and render markets more competitive.ss As previously discussed
and recognized by the Supreme Court, sometimes restraints are necessary
for the product to exist at all.15 6  This concept of increased efficiency is
likely what the McHugh court was driving at when it found that because the
rules prohibiting registration of foals bred by artificial insemination
contribute to the interests of those who participate in the sport, "there
would be reduced competition" without such rules.s15  Arguably, it is the
choices made by consumers-not courts-that determine what constitutes an
efficient market. If participants in the Quarter Horse market have decided
that they prefer non-cloned Quarter Horses, then the restriction at issue
ensures that the efficiencies of that market are maintained.
Continuing in the typical application of the Rule of Reason, once the
defendant establishes the restriction's pro-competitive benefits, the plaintiff
must show that the restriction is not reasonably necessary to achieve the
stated objective or that the anticompetitive effects outweigh the pro-
competitive effects15s Typically, in cases involving rules of sport, the
objective of the governing body is either to define and preserve the game or
to ensure the health and safety of its participants. In the context of a breed
registry, registration rules will likely be for the purpose of defining and
promoting the breed and associated competition. Thus, as the court did in
McHugh, in weighing the relative merits of the anticompetitive and pro-
competitive effects, a court must consider; (i) whether the prohibition is an
attribute of and helps a registry's objective of defining the breed; and (ii)
whether in answering this question the breed registry should be afforded
some deference. Often, in cases involving antitrust challenges to "rules of
sport" and sports leagues, courts provide the governing body with some
welfare," Judge Posner means "the economist's concept of efficiency." RIcHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001). There is, however, some disagreement among academics as to
whether the promotion of economic efficiency is a goal of antitrust laws. See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood &
Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal ofAntitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 191, 192 (2008).
155 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979).
1s' Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
157 McHugh v Australian Jockey Club Ltd. (No. 13)[2012] FCA 1441, 1464 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2012/1441.html.
.ss Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S 679, 688-89 (1978).
TOWARDS THE HEART OF THE SPORT
deference under the law.s' Deference to the governing body seems
appropriate, given that it is the governing body which will know how to
best preserve the game for the prosperit, of its participants and enjoyment
of its spectators.
Yet in that vein, one can see that the "balancing approach" of National
Society of Engineers may hinge disproportionality on whether the court
accepts the importance of preserving the game. In response to this concern,
an alternative multi-factor approach was set forth in Gunter Harz, in which
the courts asks:
(1) Is the standard intended to accomplish a goal consistent
with the policy justifying self-regulation;
(2) Is the action reasonably related to that goal;
(3) Is the standard no more extensive than necessary; and
(4) Has the association provided procedural safeguards, which
assure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnish a
basis for judicial review?160
The existence of this alternative approach is discussed at length by one
commenter who notes that under these factors, rules of sport will be upheld
"so long as they further the organization's goals and are not applied in a
discriminatory, arbitrary or capricious manner."' 6 ' The authors of this
Article, however, do not believe that Gunter Harz is significantly
inconsistent with the balancing approach of National Society ofEngineers. It
appears that the first factor of Gunter Harz merely substitutes as a
presumption of pro-competitive benefit. Put another way, if the standard is
intended to accomplish a goal consistent with the policy justifying self-
regulation, then that goal is pro-competitive. This certainly solves any
quandary of attempting to establish any economically-based pro-
159 See, e.g., Race Tires ofAm., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 83 (3d Cir. 2010)
(applying deference to the defendant's rules and upholding them without consideration of less restrictive
alternatives as there was "good faith, more than sufficient" pro-competitive justification for the
restraint). Professor Gabe Feldman explains that that "[a]lthough sports leagues have not been granted
blanket antitrust immunity, courts have afforded them ... deference under the law." Gabe Feldmen, A
Modest Proposalfor Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 249,249 (2013).
1"0 GunterHarz, 511 F.Supp. at 1116.
161 See Schlomi Feiner, Regulation of Playing Equipment by Sports Associations: The Antitrust
Implications, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 585, 615 (2002).
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competitive benefits by recognizing that for a voluntary, self-regulatory
organization, self-regulation and the goals related to self-regulation are
themselves pro-competitive. Meanwhile, the second and third factors of
Gunter Harz appear to ask the same question as the third factor of the
balancing approach-that is, whether the restriction is reasonably necessary
to achieve the stated objective.
The only factor that truly distinguishes Gunter Harz is the "due
process" concern. Procedural safeguards undoubtedly refer to some sort of
opportunity for "notice and comment," and presumably organizations that
have failed to provide such safeguards might not be afforded as much
latitude by the court when it determines the legitimacy of the restriction at
issue. Nonetheless, under this approach, most non-arbitrary "rules of sport"
would survive Rule of Reason scrutiny. As explained by one court:
A membership organization ... as a voluntary organization
or one of a social nature of sports organization must be left
to legislate its own rules and its own guidelines for
participation of its members for the purposes for which it
was created so long as that legislation is not done in an
unreasonable manner and without malice or intention to
harm a single member or segment of membership. Such
membership organizations have the right to adopt such
rules to protect their very existence. 162
D. Applicability ofthe Quick Look Doctrine
A full Rule of Reason analysis (whether under the balancing or
alternative approach) may not be needed if the defendant can successfully
assert that that the Quick Look Doctrine applies. Courts can use the
"quick look" to bypass full Rule of Reason analysis. In Texaco v. Dagher, the
Supreme Court first introduced the Quick Look Doctrine."1  Without
conducting a full Rule of Reason analysis, the Court concluded that the
162 STP Corp. v. U.S. Auto Club, Inc., 286 F.Supp. 146, 151 (S.D. Ind. 1968).
163 Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
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practice at issue was "core" to the business itself.'14  The Court explained
that a practice might be "ancillary to the legitimate and competitive
purposes of the business association, and thus valid."'6 s These words echo a
common law approach known as the ancillary restraint doctrine, under
which courts take into account the uniqueness of some businesses.166
Indeed, the Quick Look Doctrine was again mentioned by the Supreme
Court in American Needle, when it explained that "[when] 'restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all' . . . the Rule
of Reason may not require a detailed analysis; 'it can sometimes be applied
in the twinkling of an eye."' 67
Following American Needle, a number of cases involving sports leagues
have used the Quick Look Doctrine to bypass a full Rule of Reason
analysis. For instance, in Agnew v. NCAA, the Seventh Circuit agreed that
it had a license to find some rules to be pro-competitive and thus the Rule
of Reason could be applied "in the twinkling of an eye." 1s In Rock v.
NCAA, the Southern District of Indiana provided the NCAA ample
latitude when it determined that the NCAA's prohibition concerning
athletics-based aid maintains the tradition of amateurism in college sports
and thus the prohibition was presumptively pro-competitive "in the
twinkling of an eye."16 Similarly, in Washington v. NFL, the District of
Minnesota found that "the Rule of Reason compels the conclusion that,
even if there is concerted action to restrain trade in Plaintiffs' images, that
agreement 'is necessary to market the product at all' and is therefore not
illegal."170
16 Id. at 7.
165 id.
166 Under this approach, "[i]f the restraint is merely ancillary to some other legitimate business
purpose and is not intended to either harm the market or the field of competition, the court can then
feel satisfied that the restraint is merely a function of a unique business arrangement where certain
practices are recognized as harmless to the workings of a free market economy." See Thane Rosenbaum,
Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 729, 738 (1987). The ancillary restraint doctrine accounts for the needs of a particular
industry. Thus, under this approach, standards on registration could be justified on the association's
need to maintain competitive aspects of the sport.
167 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010).
16s Agnew v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012).
16' Rock v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1026 (S.D. Ind. 2013).
1o Washington v. Nat'1 Football League, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1007 (D. Minn. 2012).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING ANTITRUST SUITS TO REDEFINE
A SPORT: DEVALUATION OF THE SPORT
Arguably, the ultimate product produced by a breed registry is
entertainment by staging competitions that are consumed by their
participants and spectators. Thus, the governing body of the breed registry
has an economic incentive to establish rules that maximize the value of its
breed and the breed's associated competitive activities. Rules and standards
set forth by the governing body affect the value of that competition by
defining the breed and adding excitement to its associated activities.
Perhaps the greatest fear is that in the area of equestrian competition where
the end goal is to produce a winner, cloning will only incentivize breeders to
produce more of the same previous winners. Is a field proliferated with the
"same" winners more entertaining? Is watching ten California Chromes
race against each other more exciting?
This is, of course, difficult to determine ex ante, but it would certainly
change the experience of Thoroughbred racing from the perspectives of
both the participants and the spectators.
The typical allegations involving restrictions on registration based on
reproductive technique are anticompetitive include arguments that the
reproductive technique at issue would make it cheaper for breeders to breed.
For instance, the plaintiffs in AQHA argued that cloning will expand the
supply of "elite" Quarter Horses and that increased supply would decrease
price and thereby eliminate barriers to entry to the breeding market."' The
policy behind antitrust law is to promote the economic welfare of
consumers, not the competing breeder-manufacturers, though to a certain
extent they are one and the same here.'72 Nonetheless, it remains not
entirely clear how the plaintiffs in AQHA demonstrated that consumers
were injured, whether those consumers are the breeder-manufacturers of
.71 Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 41, at 43-44. Whether cloning will actually
increase supply is highly questionable. Cloning is an expensive venture, costing approximately $150,000
per attempt, with a low success rate. As noted in Part I, only a very low percentage of clones survive.
172 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (holding that antitrust
laws protect consumers, not competitors); The Antitrust Laws, FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited
Oct. 16, 2014) ("Yet for over 100 years, the antitrust laws have had the same basic objective, to protect
the process of competition for the benefit of consumers . . . .").
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Quarter Horses or mere participants and spectators at Quarter Horse
competitions. Typically, consumer welfare is maximized through antitrust
laws by ensuring the existence of higher quality products, lower prices,
greater choice, and greater innovation. 73
How quality is defined in the equestrian breeding and competition
market is questionable and is perhaps central to the issue. Many consumers
may consider cloned horses to be of lesser quality than naturally bred
horses, even though they are genetically identical. A good comparison is
that of synthetic diamonds to natural diamonds. Today, synthetic
diamonds are virtually indistinguishable from natural diamonds.174
Nevertheless, jewelry consumers stronger prefer the latter-which take 3
billion years to create-over the former-which take 3 weeks.17 s Perhaps the
reason for this preference is that for certain products the value in owning
the product is not only in the physical "thing" but also in the process by
which that "thing" was created. One can draw from the diamond analogy
again when we see that the availability of synthetic diamonds have not
decreased the price of natural diamonds.'7 ' In fact, even with the
proliferation of synthetic diamonds, the price of natural diamonds has
steadily increased. 77
As to greater choice, cloning may introduce otherwise unavailable
genes into the pool, but again, one questions whether this hypothesis will
prove to be true if, as the AQHA plaintiffs assert, cloning would be used to
manipulate and isolate certain "desirable" genetic attributes.'
17 Id.
1' Lab-Created Diamond FAQ, GEMESIs, http://gemesis.com/education/faqs/ (last visited Sept.
18, 2014) (explaining that both lab-created and natural diamonds "have the same physical, chemical and
optical properties and emerge as rough diamonds . . .. [b]oth are, in fact, diamond").
"s Elizabeth F. Purinton, Does Artificial Diamond Equate Artificial Love?: Consumers'Attitudes, 19
Am,. Soc'Y Bus & BEHAV. Sci. PROC. 1 (2012), available at
http://asbbs.org/fles/ASBBS2012V1/PDF/P/PurintonE.pdf; Elsa Wenzel, Synthetic diamonds still a
rough cut, CNET NEws, (Feb. 14, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/Synthetic-diamonds-still-a-rough-
cut/2100-113953-6159542.html.
16 Chloe Wu, The Impact of Synthetic Diamonds on the Natural Diamond Industry,
EUROMONITOR INT'L (July 9, 2014), http://blog.euromonitor.com/2014/07/the-impact-of-synthetic-
diamonds-on-the-natural-diamond-industry.html (explaining that natural stones "continue to command
a premium over their synthetic counterparts").
177 Yury Spektorov, Olya Linde & Pierre-Laurent Wetli, The Global Diamond Industry: Portrait of
Growth, BAIN & CO. (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/global-diamond-
industry-portrait-of-growth.aspx.
17s Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 41, at 47.
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With respect to greater innovation, is this type of innovation desirable?
In AQHA, Abraham and Veneklasen suggest that the ability to isolate
genetics is a positive attribute of cloning. While cloning could arguably be
used the increase genetic diversity, will this be the most likely outcome?
Alternatively, as the AQHA fears, will cloning be used to create a Quarter
Horse population that has substantially less genetic diversity? One can see
the perverse effects of isolating attributes in certain canine breeds, whose
features have become grossly distorted due to "unnatural" selection."'
Indeed, some breeds such as the English Bulldog are facing serious health
issues because they have been bred to conform to arbitrary standards of
desirability."s' Is it an antitrust violation for a breed registry charged with
improving the breed to adopt rules designed to avoid such results?
Of course, we must also query whether a breed registry can be
presumed to be maximizing the value of the sport through its registration
standards. The governing body of a breed registry is often comprised of
breeders who have an economic interest in the sale of the input. Thus,
those in charge may have an economic incentive to adopt inefficient
standards and not maximize the value of the sport. However, by itself, an
economic interest in the sale of the input is not sufficient to produce
anticompetitive effect.'"' Breeders who participate in the governance of the
breed registry will injure themselves economically if because of their stake
in the input they insist on creating an inferior, less desirable product.182 If
breeders insist on the inferior product, then the market will provide the
necessary sanction;1" antitrust sanctions are unnecessary and possibly
anticompetitive.
Indeed, when "rules of sport" are altered through antitrust scrutiny,
adverse implications arise. Two implications of particular concern to breed
registries are the impairment of long-term competition and the reduction in
skills required to participate in the sport. Long-term competition is
impaired because the alteration of a "rule of sport" undercuts the value of
'" See Lindsay Pollard-Post, Why Is HBO's 'Real Sports' Calling Foul on Dog Breeding?, PETA
(Apr. 26,2014), http://www.peta.org/blog/hbo-real-sports-dog-breeding/.
1s1 Lopatka, supra note 82, at 29.
182 See id.
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competition between current and former participants. The conception of
long-term competition is useful in understanding that the rule-making
body is trying to preserve the integrity, traditions, and character of the
sport. Take, for instance, cases where the rule at issue prohibits the use of
newly developed equipment, which would otherwise provide players with a
competitive advantage.'84 The governing bodies in these cases resisted
innovations that would arguably change the way the game is played. 85
What is any different in equestrian competitions, such as Thoroughbred
racing, where fielding multiples of the same horse would forever change
how trainers, jockeys, and spectators engage in the sport?
Exploration of the human capacity is also impaired and the skills
required of human participants in the sport are reduced when "rules of
sport" are changed arbitrarily. Value is derived from competing against the
limits of nature. In breeding horses, the limits of nature are clearly being
manipulated when assisted reproductive techniques are used, whether those
techniques are artificial insemination or cloning. Rules that prohibit
assisted reproductive techniques attempt to establish boundaries for
breeding winners unmodified by technological advances that permit the
manipulation of genetics. The concept of nature also supports another,
related value of equine sport-the skill to ride or train a winner. These
skillsets correlate with the genetic diversity of the candidate pool.
Arguably, the less diverse the pool, the fewer skills required to be a
successful rider or trainer.
Undoubtedly, self-regulating breed registries must set rules in order to
meet their purpose of defining and promoting the breed through
registration and associated competitive activities. Courts should provide
deference to the registries setting such rules, because these are "rules of
sport." Indeed, failing to do so may produce some of the foregoing perverse
effects, which are antithetical to antitrust policy. Moreover, breed registries,
such as the AQHA, are essential to maintaining the breed. Continued
antitrust litigation may intimidate and deter breed registries from
1 See Gunter Harz, 511 F. Supp. 1103 (upholding the USTA's rule prohibiting the use of
double-strung tennis racquets allowing players to give more spin to the ball); see also Weight-Rite Golf v.
U.S. Golf Ass'n, 766 F.Supp. 1104 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (upholding the USGA's rule prohibiting the use of
a golf shoe that assisted golfers in distributing their weight in a manner that assisted with their swing).
' See Gunter Harz Sports, 511 F. Supp. 1103; see also Weight-Rite Golf 766 F. Supp. 1104.
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organizing or continuing to operate. So long as the registry is establishing
rules reasonably connected to its purpose, courts should refrain from
applying antitrust sanctions.
